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10618.00002/140716.1

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5	Attorneys for NHW, INC.	
6		
7	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
8	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
9		
10	BRIGHTON COLLECTIBLES, INC., a Delaware corporation,	Case No. 10-CV-00419-CAB-WVG
11	Plaintiff,	SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF DAVID W. SWIFT IN SUPPORT OF
12	vs.	DEFENDANT NHW'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION AS TO
13	RK TEXAS LEATHER MFG., INC., a Texas	PLAINTIFF'S LOST PROFIT DAMAGES
	corporation; K&L IMPORTS, INC., a	[REPLY TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY
14	California corporation; NHW, INC., a Texas corporation; YK TRADING, INC., a Texas	ADJUDICATION FILED CONCURRENTLY HEREWITH]
15	corporation; JCNY, a New Jersey corporation; JOY MAX TRADING, INC., a California	Hearing Date: August 23, 2012
16	corporation; AIF CORPORATION, a Texas corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,	Hearing Time: 2:30 p.m. Hearing Room: 12
17	Defendants.	The Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
18		
19	AND RELATED THIRD PARTY ACTION.	
20		
21		
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23		
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SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF DAVID SWIFT

10-CV-00419-CAB-WVG

SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA 90401 TEL 310.566.9800 • FAX 310.566.9850

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I, David Swift, declare as follows:

- 1. I am an attorney duly admitted to practice before this Court. I am an attorney with Kinsella Weitzman Iser Kump & Aldisert LLP, attorneys of record for Defendant NHW, Inc. ("NHW"). If called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to all facts within my personal knowledge except where stated upon information and belief.
- 2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of excerpts of the deposition of Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Robert Wunderlich
- 3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of a transcription of the Ninth Circuit oral argument in Brighton Collectibles, Inc. v. Coldwater Creek, Inc., Nos. 09-55624, 09-56038, before Judges McKeown, Fletcher W., and Clifton that took place on January 13, 2011 in Pasadena, California. It is my understanding that the parties settled the action for a confidential amount prior to the Ninth Circuit issuing an opinion on the matter.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge.

Executed September 28, 2012, in Santa Monica, California.

/s/ David Swift David W. Swift

10618.00002/140716.1 10-CV-00419-CAB-WVG

EXHIBIT A

May 10, 2012

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIGHTON COLLECTIBLES, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. 10CV0419-AJB-WVG

RK TEXAS LEATHER MFG., INC., d/b/a TEXAS LEATHER
MANUFACTURING, a Texas corporation; K&L IMPORTS,
INC., a California corporation, et al.,

Defendants.

VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF ROBERT WUNDERLICH, Ph.D.

May 10, 2012 9:15 a.m.

515 South Flower Street Suite 1100 Los Angeles, California

Dawn Schetne, CSR No. 5140



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May 10, 2012

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look at my first report.

- Q. I will tell you, to save you time, that my understanding is that it incorporates the copyright and the trade dress. I'm not sure about the trademark.
- A. Well, it's in a schedule in my report. You know, there's several defendants here. I certainly haven't memorized all of my tables.
- Q. Well, before you do that, because I don't think it's necessary, let me ask the question this way: Do you know whether the sales of the Brighton products that embodied the copyrights, trademarks, trade dress which were allegedly infringed upon went up or down or remained the same from the time before the alleged infringing period to the time when the alleged infringement began?
 - A. I haven't looked at that.
- Q. You haven't looked at that. Do you know whether Brighton's gross sales went up or down from the time -- well, let's ask it differently. Do you know whether Brighton's gross sales of all products went up or down during the allegedly infringing periods?
 - A. There is a schedule that addresses that.
 - Q. Let's take a look at that one.
 - A. My C series of schedules --
 - Q. Are we still on Exhibit 2000, the April 23rd



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May 10, 2012

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think you have to look -- and I haven't tried to do this quantitatively, but more closely at the particular circumstances.

- Q. Okay. And in your rather lengthy answer to that, you used the word "could" I think three or four times. You really don't know, but it's a possibility, is what you're testifying to; correct?
- A. I'm testifying that it possibly could affect the consumers differently if the products were being offered through an upscale store.
- Q. And as far as a woman who might see an allegedly infringing bag, do you differentiate between the type of woman who might see it, such as a woman that comes from a household that makes \$300,000 a year as opposed to one that comes from a household that makes \$25,000 a year, or a homeless woman?
 - A. I'm not differentiating.
- Q. Okay. Did you do any sort of valuation analysis -- well, in the context of goodwill, do you understand what a valuation analysis is?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And would it be like you're assigning a value to Brighton's goodwill in its damaged state, and then you compare it to an evaluation had there been no infringement? Would that be a correct definition?



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Robert Wunderlich, Ph.D. 118 One could conceivably in some cases calculate a 1 diminution in value, yes. 2 Have you done that for your report? 3 4 Α. Is it common to do that sort of a thing? 5 Q. MR. MONAGLE: I'm -- go ahead. I'm sorry. 6 7 MR. HELLER: Yeah, the word common is not a 8 good one, if that's where you were going. MR. MONAGLE: I missed the question a couple 9 questions back, but don't worry about it. 10 Okay. You know, why don't we take MR. HELLER: 11 a break. Does that sound good? A lunch break. Does 12 that work, Peter, if we can disturb you from your --13 I'm too busy. 14 MR. ROSS: MR. MacLEMORE: He's playing Angry Birds. 15 MR. HELLER: Let's go off the record. 16 THE VIDEO OPERATOR: We're off the record at 17 12:05 P.M. 18 19 LUNCHEON RECESS 20 21 THE VIDEO OPERATOR: We're back on the record 22 at 1:14 P.M. 23 BY MR. HELLER: 24 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Wunderlich. Would you 25



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May 10,

2012

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May 10, 2012

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are different numbers for the different categories.

- Q. So you've used the 2.06 units per transaction and applied it to the 60 percent of sales of Brighton product sold through boutiques?
- A. At the wholesale level. Well, yes, 60 percent of Brighton wholesale sales that subsequently are sold through boutiques, I have applied that same factor.
- Q. Did you do any calculations to what are normally called corrective advertising?
- A. I've looked at the amount of advertising -marketing and advertising expenditures by Brighton, but
 I have not done a -- so I've added those up, but I
 haven't expressed a corrective advertising opinion.
 - Q. Do you know what corrective advertising is?
 - A. Generally speaking, yes.
- Q. Have you ever been told that Brighton incurred costs for corrective advertising?
- A. Have I ever been told that? I don't think one way or the other. Not one way or the other.
- Q. Have you ever heard the term girlfriend marketing?
 - A. Say that again.
- Q. Have you ever heard the term girlfriend marketing?
 - A. Not specifically. I mean, I guess I could



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EXHIBIT B

In The Matter Of:

BRIGHTON COLLECTIBLES, INC.
v.
COLDWATER CREEK, INC.

ARGUMENT, ORAL - Vol. 1
January 13, 2011

MERRILL CORPORATION

LegaLink, Inc.

20750 Ventura Boulevard Suite 205 Woodland Hills, CA 91364 Phone: 818.593.2300 Fax: 818.593.2301

Page 1

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 09-55624 & 09-56038 (Consolidated)

BRIGHTON COLLECTIBLES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

COLDWATER CREEK, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
Case No. 06-CV-1848-H(POR)
District Judge Marilyn L. Huff

ORAL ARGUMENT

JANUARY 13, 2011

HELD BEFORE:

JUDGE M. MARGARET McKEOWN, PRESIDING

JUDGE WILLIAM A. FLETCHER

JUDGE RICHARD R. CLIFTON

TRANSCRIBED BY: MELANIE M. FAULCONER

CSR No. 6420

Page 2 1 PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 2 JANUARY 13, 2011 3 ORAL ARGUMENT ---0---6 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Thank you, your Honors. Good morning, and may it please the Court. My 8 9 name is Cate Stetson, representing Coldwater Creek. 10 Can I set aside five minutes for rebuttal, 11 please? 12 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Yes. You have a clock 13 there, and I'll also try to look and help you. 14 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Okay. Thank you. 15 We've raised a number of issues in our 16 briefing, but in the time we have this morning, I'd like 17 to focus on what I think are the three predominant legal 18 issues. 19 Issue Number One, of course, is the thin 20 copyright question, whether the Court erred when it 21 instructed the jury that the jury need only find 2.2 substantial similarity. Issue Number Two of law is the trade dress 23 question, which is whether the Court committed error 24 25 when it instructed the jury that it could find -- for

Page 3

ORAL ARGUMENT - 1/13/2011

1 the defendant on the trade dress question if it found 2 secondary meaning without separately instructing the 3 jury that if the trade dress is generic, there is no protection full stop. The third issue, of course, is damages, which 5 is whether this expert for Brighton correctly put in 6 7 front of the jury relevant data and supported his theories of damages with substantial evidence so that 8 9 the jury in a lost profits case could have some clarity 10 and satisfaction that the damages it awarded were 11 actually within some reasonable approximation of damages. 12 So taking it from the top on the copyright 13 14 issue, it's the law of this Court -- Harper House and 15 Apple and Mattel -- that unoriginal elements of a work 16 are not protectable. 17 So the question in this case is, when you have 18 a silver heart design where all of the individual 19 component pieces of that heart themselves are concededly 20 not original and not protectable, what you have then is 21 what this Court calls a "thin copyright." 22 The copyright exists. The work certainly is 23 protectable. There was a Brighton designer who designed this heart and there was a copyright conferred on -- on 24 25 Brighton for this heart.

1	But the question is, outside of that particular	
2	selection or assembly of elements, how far does the	
3	copyright extend?	
4	And what Harper House and Apple and to a	
5	certain extent Satava versus Lowry teach, it teaches	
6	that in order for another work, another silver	
7	decorative heart to infringe, that silver heart has to	
8	look virtually identical to the heart that has the	
9	copyright protection.	
10	JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Well, I think it really	
11	depends on how you read Apple and these other cases	
12	because, as I read them, the question is, if you have	
13	unprotectable elements in and of themselves but you put	
14	them together and you have a compilation, then you have	
15	to figure out, well, with that compilation how many	
16	different ways might one do that? Is there just one	
17	way, like the Skye vodka bottle or something like that,	
18	a tile or something, some of the other cases the Court	
19	has looked or there are multiple ways?	
20	So it's not simply because you have	
21	unprotectable elements that are put together doesn't	
22	mean you move to the virtual identical identity	
23	standard.	
24	So I'd appreciate your response to the argument	
25	of Brighton, which is, "Well, there's" they use the	

Page 5

ORAL ARGUMENT - 1/13/2011

1 "gazillion" because it's been used in one of the 2 cases --3 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Right, right. 4 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: -- "there's a gazillion 5 ways you can -- can make these fanciful hearts and doodads and other things that go with them." 6 So what is your response to that? CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Well, my response is, 8 9 I think Brighton is overreading Mattel. The "gazillion" 10 phrase comes from Mattel (unintelligible), and what 11 Mattel relied on for this -- this notion of the breadth or narrowness of "protectability" was Page 1139 of 12 Apple. And I commend it to you specifically because 13 14 this is what the Apple Court says: 15 "When the range and protectable and 16 unauthorized expression is narrow, the 17 appropriate standard for elicit copying is 18 virtual identity." 19 So we're talking about circumstances where the 20 range of "protectable expression" -- and this is 2.1 unprotectable -- is narrow. 22 How many different ways can this expression, 2.3 this combination be carried out? The standard is virtual identity. 24 2.5 There is a little bit of --

Page 6 JUDGE FLETCHER: Why do you say that there's a 1 limited number of ways? 2 3 I mean, given you've got a heart shape, but it 4 seems to me there are lots of things you can do with a 5 heart shape. 6 Why is a heart shape different from a doll 7 face, for example? 8 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESO.: Uh-huh. 9 There are certainly a number of different things you can do with a heart shape. 10 11 And if you look at record excerpts 236 and 237, 12 this is the conversation that Coldwater's counsel had 13 with the designer of the Brighton heart. And what she says I think is -- is telling and very instructive on 14 15 the legal issue here, which is, "This is my heart. designed it." 16 17 There have been elements of roping and flower buds and scrolls all throughout silver design for, you 18 know, decades if not hundreds of years. In fact, you 19 20 know, in design generally these elements are common. 21 If you look over to the left, you see roping on 22 the plaster. If you look above your head, you see 23 scrolls. If you look to the right, you see chevrons. 24 What the designer of the Brighton heart did was 25 to take all those elements and put it together. That's

Page 7 1 her work. 2 But it is only copyrightable to the extent that if someone comes along and makes a heart that is 3 virtually identical to that heart, then copyright is 5 infringed. 6 JUDGE FLETCHER: What does -- what does vir- --7 I mean, I'm sympathetic to your argument. mean, we're -- we're having to do things in words. 8 But 9 in fact we're talking about something visual. 10 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Right, right. 11 JUDGE FLETCHER: And to what extent can we kind of 12 cut passed the words to the underlying purpose of these 13 tests, which I think in this context really is, "Does 14 someone looking at one heart think that he or she is really looking at the same heart when she's actually --15 he or she is actually look at the other one?" 16 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Sure. 17 JUDGE FLETCHER: And if you put things side by side, 18 19 okay, one has little dots and the other one has ropes. 20 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Right, right. 2.1 JUDGE FLETCHER: The chevron shape in the middle of 22 the heart is a little different from one to the next. 2.3 understand that. 24 Virtually identical doesn't quite capture the notion of, is the average or even the attentive viewer 2.5

- seeing one without the other the other one immediately
- 2 to the side going to be confused?
- 3 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Uh-huh.
- 4 It's true just starting from your comment about
- 5 words having sort of a limited function. I think
- 6 that's --
- JUDGE FLETCHER: When we're dealing with -- in the
- 8 end we're dealing with something visual. Yeah.
- 9 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: True. And I'd
- 10 emphasize too that it's difficult even on this paper
- 11 record to appreciate what even Brighton's heart designer
- 12 and the chief marketing officer conceded were
- differences between these two hearts.
- 14 You have at record excerpts 271 a concession by
- Brighton's chief marketing officer that these two hearts
- 16 are not identical.
- JUDGE FLETCHER: Of course they're not. Of course
- 18 they're not identical.
- 19 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: If that were the symbol
- or if that were the standard, you might have had a
- 21 different -- might have had a different result --
- 22 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Yes.
- 23 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: -- as far as their
- 24 identical.
- 25 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: I think that's right.

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               And just as an aside, I know this Court was --
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      was interested in discussing the harmless error question
 3
      with respect to civil jury instructions.
               On -- on either jury instruction that is the
 5
      main focus of these arguments, either on thin copyright
 6
      or on trade dress, which we can discuss later on, it
 7
      plainly was not harmless error in part because of that
 8
      very testimony. In certain --
 9
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Apart -- apart from the
10
      general cases that talk about the thin copyright, the
11
      virtual identicality, is there any case that you can
12
      think of that most closely approximates this
13
      amalgamation that is the heart in this case?
14
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: I think the best case,
      your Honor, is actually the very thorough Walker &
15
      Zanger case out of the Northern District of California.
16
17
      You tend to -- I'm choosing that because I think it is a
      very detailed recitation of this Court's precedence.
18
19
      It's relatively recent. It's from 2007. It has to do
20
      with tile, which your Honor mentioned earlier.
2.1
      it concluded on the copyright right issue -- it's
22
      actually instructive on both copyright and trade dress,
23
      but on the copyright right issue what it said was, there
24
      is with respect to a few of these tile designs, not all
      of them, some modicum of originality that was brought
25
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- 1 into a sort of public domain or common tile design, but
- 2 the copyright is thin because it only extends to protect
- 3 that originality.
- 4 That I think is the most apropos comparison to
- 5 a product design.
- 6 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: But of course on
- 7 copyright law, originality doesn't have the same meaning
- 8 that it does, for example, in patent law.
- 9 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: True.
- 10 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: "Originality" means "I
- 11 didn't copy it from him."
- 12 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Right. Something --
- 13 something that grew out of an idea.
- 14 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: As opposed to that "I
- 15 dreamed up something so totally unusual that no one else
- 16 had dreamed it up."
- I mean, you don't need that kind of originality
- 18 in copyright.
- 19 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Correct.
- JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: So that's why again the
- 21 words -- sometimes we run into the problems with the
- 22 words when we're really talking about visual
- 23 depictions.
- 24 So it is original in -- in terms of what was
- 25 put together. The question is -- because it was not

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      copied from another source directly, the question then
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      is, the degree of protection, you know, from -- from
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      virtual to substantial.
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Right.
 5
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: And I guess I'm looking
 6
      for some other products or designs that might fall in
 7
      this category.
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.:
                                       Sure.
 9
               Well, in addition to the tile design out of
10
     Walker & Zanger, you have some rug designs in the
11
      Tufenkian case out of the Second Circuit.
12
               But I think probably most apropos to the
      compilation question we're confronting here is Harper
13
14
      House in addition to Apple, which we've discussed a
15
      little bit, but Harper House is the case involving an
      organizer, and what the Ninth Circuit concluded was that
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17
      in a case where you have standing alone unoriginal
18
      elements -- and, Judge McKeown, you're certainly right
19
      that "unoriginal" means something different in copyright
20
      law than it does in patent. It doesn't have to be new
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      or novel -- but when you have unoriginal elements, the
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      assemblage of those elements, the compilation is what --
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      is what is protectable and is the only thing that is
     protectable.
24
25
               What the Brighton silver heart designer here
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created was a protectable design, but it was only
1
2
      protectable as to her design. As she says in her
      testimony, "This is my heart. I put it together."
 3
               The fact that other people have used roping or
 5
      chevron or flower buds or scrolls or dots or hearts is
6
      irrelevant because it's her design that's copyrighted.
 7
               But the flip side of that, it's only her design
 8
      that's copyrighted.
9
               And the reason I'm going back to your question,
10
      Judge Fletcher, about the -- the reasons behind
      this kind of constraint that they put on visual design,
11
12
      I think the Court's earlier precedence and those from
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      the Second Circuit, which appears to be, you know, the
      the hotbed of its own copyright litigation, the reason
14
15
      for this has to do with the notion that particularly
16
      when you're talking about design of products and you're
17
      talking about a copyright or a trade dress, which can be
      forever, you want to be very careful not to 'fence off'
18
19
      from other designs, other innovations, even competition
20
      the core elements of any particular industry or trade.
21
               The fact that this heart was made out of
22
      elements that are common in this industry, common in
      silversmithing is itself too broad an idea for them to
23
24
      'fence off' anything other than the heart that Brighton
25
      designed.
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          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Could you move on to the
 2
      trade dress issue and the jury instruction referencing
      "generic"?
 3
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Sure.
 5
               The jury instruction referencing generic, the
 6
      reason it was faulty has to do with -- with what the
 7
      instruction did not say. And this is at record excerpt
 8
      117, and here's what the judge instructed:
 9
               "A generic mark or trade dress without
10
          secondary meaning does not receive trademark
11
          protection."
12
               And then there's a an example of a "generic"
13
      word, which of course is hard, as you said, Judge
14
      Fletcher, to translate over to visual protection.
15
               "A product design is generic if it is
16
          so common that it cannot be identified with a
17
          particular source. A claim of trade dress for
18
          a product design requires proof of secondary
19
          meaning."
2.0
               And that was legal error.
               What the Court should have instructed the jury
21
2.2
      and what Coldwater Creek sought for the jury to be
23
      instructed was that a generic trade dress does not
      receive protection full stop.
24
25
               Now, here again we run into some -- some
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1
      different strains of nomenclature when it comes to the
      question "What is generic?" in trade dress.
 2
 3
               When you have of a trademark, when you have a
 4
      word it's relatively easy to explain, and the Court
 5
      explained to this jury what a generic word is. You
 6
      can't trademark the word "hamburger" because it's too
 7
      generic.
 8
               With "trade dress" the question is a little bit
 9
      different, and the question as -- courts have explored
      this issue and have described it is, "Are you trying in
10
11
      your claim of trade dress elements to" -- again I'll use
12
      the phrase -- "'fence off' too many things to your own
13
      intellectual property protection?"
               So here if you look at our record excerpts,
14
15
      there is a description in the response to
16
      interrogatories about what exactly were the elements of
17
      trade dress that Brighton is claiming.
18
               And the elements of trade dress were a silver
19
      heart in conjunction with two or more of the following
20
      elements, including cowhide or leather or brocade or
2.1
      other silver hearts. At various points in the trial,
22
      you had Brighton witnesses talking about how the trade
      dress also had to do with black or brown leather or
2.3
24
      braiding.
2.5
               But at the bottom there are -- there are two
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      separate issues here. The first on the jury
 2
      instruction, your Honor, is none of that collection or
 3
      assemblage of elements gave the jury any close
      instruction on what exactly the trade dress was that was
 4
 5
      claimed, and the elements themselves -- getting back to
 6
      the generic point -- are utterly common in this
 7
      industry: leather, brocade, braiding, colors, if you
 8
      want to throw that in, which didn't appear to be part of
 9
      the trade dress except in a couple witness' testimony,
10
      silver --
11
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING:
                                     I wouldn't go with
12
      colors, whether they argued it, but of course we know
13
      that those can be descriptive; they can acquire
14
      secondary meaning.
15
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESO.: True.
16
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: So I don't think that
17
      those are unprotectable in the trademark world.
               I guess my -- my problem, which I will also
18
19
      discuss with Brighton's counsel, is the suggestion that
20
      in the jury instruction that you can have secondary
21
      meaning on top of a generic mark or a generic trade
22
      dress, which I think -- speaking only for myself not the
23
      panel, but I think that misstates the law both from the
24
      Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit.
25
               The question I have is, "Well, then what?"
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Page 16 1 because looking at the closing arguments, and even 2 trying to parse through the testimony, it didn't seem 3 that it was really argued, "Well, look. This really is generic, so don't even go there, Jury." And so I'm 5 wondering if it might be harmless error in the scheme of 6 things --7 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESO.: Well --8 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: -- even assume -- let's 9 just assume that the jury instructions legally misstate 10 11 CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Sure. 12 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: -- and were in error --CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: And -- and I do agree 13 14 with you, Judge McKeown, that -- that when it comes to 15 the instruction from this Court and the Supreme Court, 16 it's simply not the case that you can leapfrog over a 17 generic misdetermination, find secondary meaning and 18 rescue a generic trade dress. 19 But as for harmless error, you know, the jury 20 was not instructed on whether or not this trade dress 21 was generic. 22 And what do you have in the record are 23 persistent attempts, I would say, by Coldwater's counsel 24 to establish with each of the witnesses who spoke about 25 trade dress what exactly the contours of this trade

```
1
      dress were and how they were limited.
               And if the jury had been instructed on
 2
      "genericness" and the lawyer had been permitted to
 3
      arque "genericness" as a -- as a threshold cutoff to any
 5
      further discussion of secondary meaning or customer
 6
      confusion, I think you would likely have had a very
 7
      different outcome.
 8
               That of course isn't even the standard.
 9
               Under the two cases that your order cited,
10
      Gambini and Kennedy, both of which dealt with the
11
      harmless error and civil jury instructions, the question
12
      is, if there is any evidence to support the notion, the
      jury could have found your way, if you're the aggrieved
13
      party asking for an instruction you didn't get.
14
15
               Now, in Kennedy --
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: What if -- could -- could
16
17
      this -- let's assume it's in error and you're just
18
      walking down this path. Could this Court determine that
      as a matter of law the trade dress is not generic and
19
20
      therefore that it's a harmless instruction?
21
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Your Honor, I think the
22
      question of whether something is or is not generic is
23
      something that should be put to the jury.
24
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: I mean, usually --
25
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: It can be --
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```
JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: It's usually a question
1
 2
      of --
 3
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Right.
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: -- fact. But you can
 5
      still have summary judgment on things that are questions
 6
      of fact where there's --
 7
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Exactly.
 8
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: -- where you make a
 9
      le- -- like, "Here's all the facts. What's the legal
10
      judgment?"
11
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: You're certainly right
12
      that you can even in a fact question have summary
13
      judgment granted.
               But I would submit that in this case where the
14
15
      Court went off the rails in the jury instructions, it
16
      would be important to send that issue back for either
17
      the Court, in the first instance, which you will
      remember granted summary judgment only in part on the
18
19
      copyright and trade dress issues here, concluding that
20
      the rest of it needed to be sent to the jury.
21
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Well, let me ask you a
22
      related question.
23
               Let's just assume that the damage was upheld
      and then it went -- and -- and let's assume it went back
24
25
      on the generic question or I quess it would be the trade
```

```
dress question, and let's say the jury -- and it said,
 1
 2
      "You know, you can't have generic trade dress, but if
 3
      you show that you're at least descriptive or above" --
 4
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Right.
 5
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: -- "and you get secondary
 6
      meaning, you're -- you're in the pink and you can keep
 7
      going" and the jury came out in favor of Brighton.
 8
               Would you need to have another damages trial or
 9
      would you -- would you be able -- if there were no error
10
      in the damages stick with the damages?
11
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Assuming -- assuming
      the exact path that you set out, which is that the same
12
13
      trade dress is -- is in play, which of course is a
14
      difficult question to assume because the contours of the
      trade dress are ill-defined, and the same therefore
15
16
      number of products are in play, you probably could not
17
      take away some increment of damages based on that
18
      subsequent verdict from the way that you've laid it
19
      out.
20
               But let me on that point get quickly to the
21
      damages issue because I know I'm running out of my
22
      time.
23
               The damages issue I think is -- is most plainly
      brought forward by Brighton's expert Wunderlich's own
24
      testimony, and you can find it at excerpts of record 274
25
```

```
to about 286, and I want to focus you on two particular
 1
 2
      strains of argument that Mr. Wunderlich offers. One of
 3
      them has to do what I'll call the "lost sale" theory,
 4
      which is for every Coldwater sale Brighton lost a sale.
 5
      And you can find that most plainly at record excerpts
      276 and 278, Brighton lost 115,000 opportunities to sell
 6
 7
      its products.
 8
               That is the data predicate for what Brighton is
 9
      now describing as its "actual damages" theory, which is
      what Brighton calls its "lost customer" theory, which is
10
11
      because Coldwater was selling less expensive bags,
12
      certain Brighton customers walked away from Brighton
13
      never to return again.
14
               The problem is that both in his expert
      testimony and in counsel's closing argument the basis
15
16
      for that theory was the Coldwater sales, the 115,000
17
      Coldwater sales that led in turn to this 1.7 multiplier
      that we discuss in our brief that led in turn to a
18
19
      damages award.
20
               Now, the problem is, as this Court has pointed
21
      out in the Polar Bear Productions case and the Murphy
22
      Tugboat case before that and several others, it's
23
      certainly the case that you don't need to show lost
24
     profits -- you can't -- with any mathematical
25
      certainty.
```

```
But what you do need to show under Polar Bear
 1
      Productions is that the calculation was based on
 2
      relevant data and supported by substantial evidence.
 3
 4
               The problem here is that essentially the expert
 5
      was supporting one theory with data drawn from another.
 6
               So just by way of analogy, if you want to find
 7
      out, you know, the total amount of tuition paid to USC,
      you don't start by asking how many students there are at
 8
 9
      UCLA. That's in essence the problem.
10
          JUDGE FLETCHER: Could you narrow the analogy by
11
      telling me precisely what his mistake was? Because I'm
12
      not sure I understand it yet.
13
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Sure.
14
               His mistake was in importing the Coldwater
15
      sales, the 115,000 Coldwater sales as a predicate for --
16
          JUDGE FLETCHER: What do you mean --
17
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: -- Brighton's --
18
          JUDGE FLETCHER: What do you mean by "predicate"?
19
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: If you look at Page 276
20
      to 278 where he gets into his theory exactly, what he
      describes is that he's taking this number as what he
21
22
      calls "a convenient assumption" --
          JUDGE FLETCHER: Yeah.
2.3
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: -- a 1-to-1
24
2.5
      correspondence between Coldwater sales and Brighton's.
```

Page 22

1 But then he starts playing with that number a little 2 bit. He says, "Well, on the other side of my theory, 3 the 'lost Brighton customer' theory, if you take this 4 number and you divide it by" -- he says -- "6 or 7, you 5 get 20,000 Brighton customers." 6 And that certainly seems like a good estimate 7 for customers who would have walked away from 8 Brighton. 9 JUDGE FLETCHER: Let me -- let me cut to the chase, 10 if I may. 11 As I read your brief, you were saying this 12 1-to-1 theory didn't make any sense because the price of 13 the Brighton product was so much more than the price of 14 the Coldwater product, and to assume that if someone 15 buys a Coldwater product purse that that same person would have bought a Coldwater purse is ridiculous, which 16 17 I think is quite right. But that wasn't his theory. His theory was, 18 "This is a knock-off. People buy Brighton products in 19 20 part because it's special. And if they see people 21 walking around with purses that are very similar and 22 easily confused that can be bought very cheaply, the fun 23 or pleasure of having bought an expensive product 24 disappears and so the sales fall off." 2.5 So those are two very different theories.

```
CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: They are. But that's
 1
      the problem with Dr. Wunderlich's data is that in order
 2
      to support your -- your theory, you're exactly right,
 3
      the "lost customer" theory --
 4
          JUDGE FLETCHER: I don't -- I don't have -- I don't
     have a theory.
 6
 7
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Well, the theory you're
 8
      describing, I should say, the "lost customer" theory.
 9
          JUDGE FLETCHER: Right.
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: What Wunderlich did was
10
      to take the Coldwater sales as a predicate for his "lost
11
12
      customer" theory.
               Now, there's other ways to do that.
13
               If you look at a lot of the damages cases, the
14
15
      lost profits cases that are cited in Brighton's own
     brief, you will find, you know, in essence a recipe for
16
17
      how to establish lost profits. You look at market
      data. You look at comparable products. You look at --
18
      depending on the sort of case you're talking about, you
19
      look at other types of forecasts. You look at consumer
20
      purchasing data.
21
22
               The problem was that if you examined
      Wunderlich's testimony, he was borrowing data from that
23
      "lost sales" theory, the -- the, you know, for every
24
25
      lost Coldwat- -- for every Coldwater sale Brighton lost
```

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a sale, which (unintelligible) his claim, and he's using
1
      that as the starting point --
 2
          JUDGE FLETCHER: But --
 3
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: -- for his "lost
 5
      profits" theory.
 6
          JUDGE FLETCHER: But I don't read his testimony as
 7
      saying, "The lost sales are because of the sale of the
8
      Coldwater product" in the sense that that this customer
9
      would have bought Brighton if that customer had had
      available side by side a Brighton and a Coldwater.
10
11
      I just don't think he's saying that.
12
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: No. I don't think --
13
          JUDGE FLETCHER: The question -- the question is,
      does he have enough basis for figuring that this is the
14
15
      number that -- of lost sales by Brighton based upon, as
      it were, the diminution of the brand value?
16
17
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: And that is exactly the
18
      question, your Honor.
19
               And what we're saying -- what we argue in our
2.0
      brief and I'm suggesting to you here is that if you --
      if you take as the starting point from -- from the old
21
22
      Supreme Court Bigelow case, from this Court's Polar Bear
23
      Productions case that you need relevant data to support
24
      a lost profits issue, you can't draw that data from
25
      another theory and start massaging it and importing it
```

```
1
      into your theory.
 2
               There were other ways that --
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: That is the question.
 3
 4
               Your bottom line is that you think that the
 5
      data he's using is the wrong base --
 6
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Yes.
 7
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: -- for the theory that he
 8
      adopted?
 9
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Yes. I mean, it goes
10
      back to my, you know, relatively simple but I think
11
      apropos UCLA/USC analogy.
12
               If you're out to calculate a cer- -- monetize a
13
      certain element of UCLA's tuition, you don't start with
14
      USC's undergraduate student base.
15
               So too here.
16
               If you're out to monetize a -- or -- or even
17
      approach a reasonable estimate, which is all this
18
      Court's precedence demand, of Brighton's lost profits.
19
      You don't start by estimating Coldwater sales.
2.0
               You estimate exactly what, your Honor, Judge
21
      Fletcher was talking about. You ask yourself, "Based on
2.2
     market data, based on statistics of Brighton's sales of
23
      these products, based on comparable industries" -- and
24
      these are all ideas that I'm pulling from lost profits
25
      cases of the past -- "what can I demonstrate, I,
```

```
1
      Brighton's expert, about the diminution in sales at
 2
      Brighton because of Coldwater's -- because of
 3
      Coldwater's infringement on trade dress?"
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: All right. I think we'll
 5
      hear from Mr. Ross now.
 6
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Very good. Thank you.
 7
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: You've ended your time.
 8
               (Pause in proceeding.)
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Good morning, your Honors.
 9
10
      Ross for the Respondent Brighton.
11
               I'm going to start out with the genericness
12
      issue.
13
               The Wal-Mart -- in the Wal-Mart case, the U.S.
14
      Supreme Court discussed the requirements for proving
15
      that product design trade dress is protectable, and the
      Court concluded that the plaintiff in such case must
16
17
      prove secondary meaning. The U.S. Supreme Court didn't
18
      discuss "genericness" as an additional requirement.
19
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: No. What the -- what I
20
      think the Wal-Mart case and the others say is you
21
      don't -- with product design, you no longer can get
2.2
      yourself in that upper category of trademark
23
      hierarchy --
24
         PETER ROSS, ESQ.:
                             Yes.
25
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: -- but instead you must
```

1	prove secondary meaning. But they did nothing to take
2	away what at least I have understood for many years to
3	be the bottom line, which is you can't have a trademark
4	on something that's generic.
5	So I don't know if that our difference in view
6	comes in a difference in reading Wal-Mart or you have
7	another case that says you can put secondary meaning on
8	top of a generic mark or a trade dress and still get a
9	protectable item.
10	PETER ROSS, ESQ.: I understand what your Honor is
11	saying, and this is my response.
12	I think that given what the U.S. Supreme Court
13	said in Wal-Mart and thinking logically about what
14	"genericness" is, there's no need for an extra
15	requirement of genericness. It would be superfluous.
16	A generic product is by definition one that's
17	incapable of acquiring secondary meaning.
18	A plain baseball bat with no markings on it at
19	all, whose bat is it?
20	A white shirt like the one I'm wearing with a
21	collar and a single pocket on the breast and cuffs and
22	buttons, whose shirt is it?
23	A leather handbag without a single
24	embellishment on it, who made it?
25	No one would know. It's generic and it can't

```
1
      possibly acquire a secondary meaning. We don't really
 2
      need --
 3
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: But here's -- see, now
 4
      you're saying what I think I'm saying, but that's
 5
      different what you started with.
 6
               Here's the jury instruction that bothers me:
 7
               "A generic mark without secondary meaning
 8
          does not receive trademark protection."
 9
               So what that says to me is, if you can get
      secondary meaning, even if you have a generic mark, then
10
11
      you get trademark protection.
12
               So that specific statement that found its way
13
      into the jury instructions is a fairly critical
14
      situation. I know there was some discussion about it.
15
      You see that in the record.
16
               But why isn't that a legal error?
17
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: I understand the Court's point on
18
             That -- that statement itself is confusing.
19
               The rest of the -- the rest of the instruction
20
      goes on to accurately describe "genericness," and I
21
      think that no jury would be capable of finding secondary
22
      meaning were they faced with a generic product or
23
      generic trade dress.
24
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Well, the problem is it
25
      says -- it tells them they can do that. It says, you
```

1	know, "You need secondary meaning if you have generic
2	mark," and then it tells you what generic design is and
3	then it tells that if you have trade dress in your
4	design, you need secondary meaning," so basically tells
5	them, you know, "Now you go to the secondary meaning
6	instructions and see if they pan out."
7	PETER ROSS, ESQ.: I think as a matter of logic, the
8	jury simply could not have found secondary meaning if it
9	really found there was a generic trade dress.
10	But let me talk about harmless error.
11	The lessons of the Gambini and Kennedy cases
12	seem to be that the failure to give an instruction or an
13	instruction given is harmless error where no real
14	reasonable jury could have found for the other side had
15	the instruction properly been given.
16	Here I don't think any reasonable jury could
17	have found for Coldwater, even had a different
18	instruction on "genericness" been given.
19	Brighton's trade dress bags are clearly not
20	generic. We can look at them and see. They're highly
21	embellished. They have a distinctive brocaded fabric on
22	them. They have embossed letter trim. They have
23	sculpted silver hearts and braided handles. Just not a
24	generic item as a matter of law.
25	To answer

Page 30 1 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: How did this -- how did 2 this get in there? PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Well --3 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: I mean, I tried to figure 5 that out. PETER ROSS, ESQ.: I think that that instruction got 6 in there because Coldwater was requesting that the Court 8 say something about "genericness," and the Court was 9 having a hard time reconciling that request with the 10 Wal-Mart case in the absence of any generic requirement, 11 so the Court crafted an instruction. And while it was being crafted, Coldwater actually never spoke up and 12 13 said anything about it one way or another. 14 JUDGE FLETCHER: So the actual drafting of inserting 15 "generic mark" into Instruction 19 was done by the 16 judge? 17 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: By the judge in open court. 18 JUDGE FLETCHER: And there was no objection by Coldwater? 19 20 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: That's -- that's my 21 recollection. I believe that's what we say in our 22 papers. 23 JUDGE FLETCHER: Yeah. Well, I quess --24 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: There could be a problem. 25 JUDGE FLETCHER: -- if your recollection is wrong --

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JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Yeah.
1
         JUDGE FLETCHER: -- we'll hear about it.
 2.
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: I guess when I read that,
 3
      I thought that they were asking for a statement, "We
 4
 5
      want to have the jury -- make sure that it's not
 6
      generic."
               And then my problem here, as I read, Judge Huff
 7
      was, you know, a very capable judge. It somehow seemed
 8
      to get crosswise with the Wal-Mart case in some way and
 9
      then came up with this. And I was trying to go through
10
      the transcript trying to figure out how this was really
11
      happening in the -- in the jury instruction conference.
12
               So it just seemed like this -- what Coldwater
13
      asked for were generic -- what they asserted, the
14
      offense of genericness, and they said that you should
15
      have the burden of showing that your trade dress is
16
      non-generic, so they wanted an instruction to that
17
      effect, sort of a baseline instruction before you get to
18
      secondary meaning.
19
               But the Court didn't give that, so they -- I
20
      mean, they -- I guess the Court sent all the
21
      instructions they asked for that were assumed to be
22
      objections. Right? Is that how -- I mean, that's how I
23
      read the transcript.
24
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Yes.
25
```

Page 32 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: You didn't have to object 1 to get everything you asked for that didn't get given as 2 an objection? 3 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Yeah. So the way it worked is 4 this, my understanding. They were requesting the genericness 6 7 instruction. Judge Huff, who is a very careful and good 8 Judge, was sitting there in open court and started to draft this thing. There was colloquy between Brighton's 9 counsel and the judge, Coldwater's counsel doesn't 10 object, and this instruction is settled upon and given. 11 And we describe that in our Respondent's brief, 12 and in their reply, Coldwater says, "Yes, but we 13 objected because we proposed other genericness 14 15 instructions that were not given." So, as I would analyze that, their objections 16 17 were to not giving the other instructions, but no objection was raised to this instruction, which was 18 19 crafted --20 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: What about --21 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: -- in court. 22 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: One of the questions -you know, usually "genericness" is a factual issue. 23 if this instruction is wrong, just assume for talking 24 25 purposes that this instruction is a legal error, and

```
normally "genericness" is a factual issue, why wouldn't
1
     the jury have to go back and determine that?
2
         PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Because of what I was saying just
3
      a moment ago, which is that I think we can all look at
      it and say, "This is a highly embellished bag and it's
      certainly not generic," whatever else one may think of
          It's very distinctive. And it's just I -- in
7
      comparison to my white shirt, in comparison to a
8
      baseball bat with nothing on it, in comparison to a
9
      plain leather bag with two leather handles --
10
         JUDGE FLETCHER: Well --
11
         PETER ROSS, ESQ.: -- that would be generic.
12
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Where would you place --
13
      in your view, where in the trademark hierarchy do you
14
      place the Brighton compilation?
15
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Oh. Well, given Wal-Mart, we
16
      really don't have much of a hierarchy, but --
17
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: So it would be
18
19
      descriptive at best?
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: I think that's -- well, that
20
      doesn't even --
21
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: I know you don't want it
22
      to be generic/generic.
23
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: No. It doesn't even apply
24
      really, descriptive. I mean, if we were using that
25
```

```
1
      real -- that -- that hierarchy, it is inherently
 2
      distinctive. That's how people recognize it.
 3
               The -- Coldwater itself was asking its
 4
      designers to come up --
 5
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Now you're -- now you're
      merging that with secondary meaning, aren't you?
 6
 7
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Well, no.
 8
               Coldwater itself was asking its designers to
 9
      come up with a bag with a "Brightony" look.
10
               People -- there was testimony from Monica
11
      Bolin, who is the retail store owner in Michigan and she
12
      was selling a knock-off line and people came in everyday
      and said, "Is that -- isn't that Brighton? Are you
13
14
      selling Brighton?"
15
               There was testimony that people saw their ads
16
      and thought, "Why is Brighton selling their bags now in
17
      Coldwater Creek's catalogs?"
18
               All these things show that -- that the trade
19
      dress is distinctive, that it really is something people
20
      can look at and say, "Hey, that's a Brighton bag."
21
               To give another analogy, the plain leather bag
22
      with nothing on it, two leather handles, that's generic,
23
      but you just add some crosshatching quilt pattern and a
      metal link handle on it, and people are going to
24
25
      recognize that as a Chanel bag. I've now created a
```

- 1 Chanel bag. It's clearly not generic any more just by 2 adding the quilting and a metallic chain link handle.
- 3 It's embellished. People can recognize it.
- In their own market, Brighton sells 300, \$400
- 5 million a year of product. And people love it. They
- 6 collect it. On average the testimony was, a Brighton
- 7 customer owns about 10 to 12 Brighton accessories.
- JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: And they buy, what, 1.7
- 9 things when they come in or --
- 10 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: They come into the store, data
- shows that they buy 1.7 things every time they make a
- 12 transaction.
- So it's distinctive. And I don't think there's
- 14 any question about that. And I think the summary
- 15 judgment analogy is a good one. We can all look at
- 16 these bags and say, whatever they are, they might not be
- your taste, but they're certainly not generic.
- 18 JUDGE FLETCHER: Yeah. I mean, I have to say, I'm
- 19 not an expert in bags or purses, but it's hard for me
- 20 actually to see any bag that's actually on the market as
- 21 generic. Having a very simple bag with no embellishment
- 22 is in fact a design choice, and it would out -- it would
- 23 stand out in the market as well. I mean, I have trouble
- 24 understanding that it's very likely that any bag being
- 25 sold would in fact be generic.

```
PETER ROSS, ESQ.: That -- that could well be the
 1
 2
      case.
 3
               It's funny that I am a handbag expert at this
 4
      point in my life.
 5
               (Laughter.)
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: I bet.
 6
 7
          PETER ROSS, ESO.: But I --
 8
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: (Unintelligible) --
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: But there was -- there was --
 9
10
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: -- a Brighton handbag.
11
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.:
                            There was one other question that
12
      Judge Fletcher asked I believe earlier, which is if the
13
      case is remanded for a determination as to whether the
14
      bags are generic --
15
          JUDGE FLETCHER: That was McKeown.
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Yeah.
16
17
          JUDGE FLETCHER: Yeah.
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Oh, okay.
18
19
          JUDGE FLETCHER: Generic judgment.
20
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: But we do look alike.
2.1
         JUDGE FLETCHER: Yeah. Right.
22
         PETER ROSS, ESQ.: I'm sorry.
23
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: We wear the same -- we do
24
      have a generic dress, I would say.
25
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Would there be any reason to
```

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1
      retry the damages?
 2
               And I don't think there would be any reason.
 3
      If the jury decides this bag or these bags are generic,
 4
      which I find impossible to believe, then no damages
      exist and the case is wiped out on trade dress.
 5
               And if the jury determines that the bags are
 6
 7
      not generic, which would have to be the result, the
 8
      damages have already been determined from these very
 9
      bags, and we don't have to retry that case either.
               Oh.
10
11
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Do you want talk about
12
      the damages?
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Okay.
13
               In my view the damages depend on whether we
14
15
      really believe in the Story Parchment case. It's a 1931
16
      Supreme Court case, but it's never been questioned or
17
      overturned. And basically it says that the fact of
18
      damage must be proven with reasonable certainty, and if
19
      the fact of damage is proven, then the amount can be
20
      left to the reasonable estimation of the jury. And the
21
      U.S. Supreme Court notes --
22
          JUDGE FLETCHER: Yeah. But that's just gets us
23
      started. Okay.
                       So --
24
         PETER ROSS, ESQ.:
                             Yeah.
25
          JUDGE FLETCHER: -- what's a reasonable estimation
```

- and what's a reasonable basis for the Brighton expert to
- 2 have informed the jury as to what his estimate was?
- 3 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Okay.
- 4 JUDGE FLETCHER: And -- and I do -- and I am
- 5 somewhat sympathetic to the argument from the other
- 6 side, that it's hard to figure out the damage to the
- 7 brand as a kind of 1-to-1, for every bag sold by
- 8 Coldwater that is a violation, that cost from the sale
- 9 of one bag of their own. I mean, that's -- that might
- 10 be right, but it might be right only because it's a
- 11 coincidence.
- 12 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Okay. Let me address that.
- But before I do, I'm just going to say one more
- 14 sentence about Story Parchment, which is that the Court
- 15 stated that its holding was particularly applicable in
- 16 antitrust, copyright and trademark where damages are
- 17 hard to pin down.
- 18 JUDGE FLETCHER: Sure.
- 19 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: So here we have the fact of
- damages.
- 21 Their expert admits that our expert says that
- 22 their expert Ellen Goldstein-Lynch said that where you
- 23 have the sale of cheap knock-offs, those harm sales of
- the authentic brand. So essentially if we have cheap
- 25 knock-offs being sold. The experts on both sides agree

```
there is the --
1
          JUDGE FLETCHER: Sure.
 2
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: -- fact of damage.
 3
          JUDGE FLETCHER: Sure, sure.
 5
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: So what did the jury have to go
 6
      on to reasonably estimate the amount of damages?
 7
               They were given, among other things, the
 8
      following evidence: that these knock-offs appeared in
9
      120 million catalogs distributed throughout the
      United States and in hundreds of retail stores across
10
11
      the country; that by Coldwater's estimate over 50
      million Americans saw these knock-offs. That's one out
12
      of every five adults in this country.
13
          JUDGE FLETCHER: Saw these knock-offs either in the
14
15
      flesh, as it were, or in the catalog?
16
         PETER ROSS, ESQ.:
                            Yeah.
17
          JUDGE FLETCHER: Did not necessarily see the real
18
      item?
19
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: That's right. You know, but a
2.0
      huge number of people saw these knock-offs.
                                                    This is a
      big, powerful company, and they were out there using
21
22
      their entire marketing power to show these knock-offs to
23
      the country, and they did a good job of it.
24
               Brighton has over 2 million customers, and on
25
      average they buy 10 to 12 Brighton accessories apiece,
```

```
1
      unless something happens to turn them off.
               So given all that, the jury found that 13,000
 2
 3
     Brighton customers would be affected by this.
                                                      That's
      less than 1 percent of the Brighton customers.
 4
               And by the way, it's significant --
 5
          JUDGE CLIFTON: But was so affected they would never
 6
 7
      buy from Brighton again?
 8
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.:
 9
          JUDGE CLIFTON: I got to say, it strikes me as a
      house of cards. I just don't understand where the
10
11
      numbers come from.
               There's no connection between the number of
12
13
      viewings you've identified and the results that are
14
      purportedly estimated because of it.
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Well, the jury in my view was
15
16
      entitled to take these facts and --
17
          JUDGE CLIFTON: Well, they didn't take facts.
18
      took testimony from an expert who acknowledged it was a
19
      convenient assumption but pushed a lot of numbers
20
      forward that I simply can't find a logical foundation
            I mean, I understand the relationship, but even
21
22
      that's not clear. The fact that something is ubiquitous
23
     doesn't mean that it's not popular. Indeed, "ubiquity"
24
     means there's a lot of popularity --
25
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Well --
```

```
1
          JUDGE CLIFTON: And the fact that things are seen
 2
      doesn't mean they're seen as knock-offs. It may seem
 3
      that "Oh, this is the bag that we're supposed to go out
      and buy."
 4
                So --
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Yeah.
          JUDGE CLIFTON: -- I'm just kind of adrift.
 6
      understand that the fact of damages is -- is -- is the
 8
      critical determination, and I'll accept that you've got
 9
      that here, but I have a real problem coming up with a
10
      number based on what was offered up.
11
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Well, what your Honor is
12
      suggesting is exactly contrary to what the experts on
      both sides concluded, which is that if you have cheap
13
      knock-offs out there --
14
15
          JUDGE CLIFTON: But you haven't told us that.
16
      You've told us that people have seen things. That's not
17
      the same thing necessarily as having cheap knock-offs
18
      out there.
19
               I mean, I accept the proposition there are
20
      cheap knock-offs out there because there are counterfeit
21
      Louie Vuitton bags; Louie Vuitton likely suffers in some
2.2
                That's fine. But the damage award is a
23
      precise figure, and I just can't figure out what it's
24
      based on.
25
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Well, the fact that the cheap
```

```
knock-offs are out there and they are -- these bags were
 1
 2
      selling for about one-fifth the price of the Brighton
 3
     bags, the effect, and this is described by the experts,
      is that women no longer believe that the Brighton bags
 4
 5
     have any cachet. That -- that's the effect that was
 6
      described and that was in evidence.
 7
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: The difficulty I have,
      and maybe you can help me, is I feel like I have this
 8
 9
      constellation of unconnected numbers or facts, and
      normally in a damage theory you construct a theory that
10
     kind of runs from one presumption through.
11
               And as Judge Fletcher said, there's so much
12
13
     mixing and matching here, so I feel like, "Well, yeah,
      there's definitely damage if it's -- if it's a
14
15
     knock-off. Lots of people saw it. Do have damage.
     have this many customers. We sold this many things."
16
17
      It's like all this is floating around and --
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Uh-huh.
18
19
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: -- there's not a coherent
20
      damages theory. And that's where once you have a fact
      of damages, our cases suggest, you know, it can't be
21
22
      speculative, and that's where we're struggling with is
      how to move what can't be totally precise from being
23
24
      speculative.
25
          JUDGE CLIFTON:
                         Yeah.
```

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PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Right. 1 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: And that's kind of a 2 3 little bit of a needling feeling I have, and I don't know yet. I mean, it's -- it's a complicated thing, as 4 5 you've explained, and there's definitely damage. 6 How do you connect up these almost related 7 facts? 8 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Well, I think -- you know, I 9 think that's where one has to give Story Parchment its 10 due saying that an antitrust, copyright and trademark 11 where the fact is proven, and these are the words of the 12 Supreme Court, the defendant assumes the risk that some estimation has to be made --13 14 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Right. PETER ROSS, ESQ.: -- of what the amount of damage 15 16 is and --17 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: But the estimates can't be -- at some point they cross to speculation. 18 Correct? 19 20 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Yes. 21 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: I mean, in other words, 22 what that case is saying, if you've got damage, you 23 don't need absolute precision to get a damages number. PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Uh-huh. 24 25 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: But that intersects with

```
all our other cases, which also say you can't speculate.
 1
          JUDGE FLETCHER: Do we have evidence in the record,
 2
      for example, that shows sales of other Brighton products
 3
      going up and the sale of the Brighton handbag at issue
 4
      going down after the appearance of the Coldwater
 5
 6
      handbag?
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.:
 8
          JUDGE FLETCHER: And what do those -- what do those
 9
      numbers tell us?
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: I don't have those numbers in
10
11
      mind but they're in the record, and that's exactly what
12
     happened.
13
               And I would point out --
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: But would that be -- but
14
15
      that's not the basis for the damages theory, is it?
16
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: No. It's just another basis for
17
      saying --
18
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: It seems like that would
19
      be a good basis.
2.0
                                But it seems to me that's
          JUDGE FLETCHER: No.
      exactly the basis for the theory. The theory is that as
21
22
      soon as these Coldwater bags come on the market, that
23
      diminishes the appeal of the Brighton bags, and that
24
      then costs sales. That's the theory.
25
         PETER ROSS, ESQ.:
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1
          JUDGE FLETCHER: That's always the theory.
 2
         PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Yeah.
          JUDGE FLETCHER: And the question then is, what data
 3
      do we have to back it up?
 5
               And it sounds as though if we have other
 6
      Brighton products continuing to go up and this
 7
      particular Brighton product maybe one of not very many
 8
      Brighton products beginning to have trouble more or less
      coinciding with the appearance of all these Coldwater
9
      bags, that's helpful.
10
          PETER ROSS, ESO.: Yeah.
11
12
          JUDGE FLETCHER: And you say there are numbers in
13
      the record but you just don't know what they are.
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: I don't know what they are.
14
15
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: But I guess what I'm
      saying, just to understand, is I think that that --
16
17
      Judge Fletcher has laid out what would be a logical
18
      damages theory.
19
               My question is, were those numbers, the
20
      following sales numbers or the delta between what used
21
      to be, was that part of your damages?
22
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: That wasn't part of the
23
      calculation made.
24
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: It wasn't part of the
25
      calculation. Okay.
```

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PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Now --
 1
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: So there's numbers, but
 2
 3
      they didn't kind of find their way into the big
      arithmetic. Right?
 4
 5
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Yeah. Let -- let me just make a
      coup- --
 6
 7
                     That's right.
               Yes.
 8
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Okay.
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: -- a couple of quick points on
 9
      this.
10
               The jury did not agree with Mr. Wunderlich's
11
      numbers. The jury found something less than
12
      Mr. Wunderlich proposed.
13
          JUDGE CLIFTON: But you've justify that by saying
14
15
      it's the range he offered up, so it's okay.
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.:
                            Yes.
16
17
          JUDGE CLIFTON: And if the range he offered up has
      no foundation in reality or we find to be purely
18
      speculative, the fact that they found a number that's
19
20
      within the range doesn't tell us anything; it doesn't
      give any confidence in the number the jury came up with.
21
22
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: That is a reasonable point.
               But the number that Dr. Wunderlich came up with
23
24
      and the number the jury came up with is a very small
25
      number, making an assumption that some number of people
```

Page 47 1 are affected, and the experts on both sides agree that 2 some --3 JUDGE CLIFTON: And they're so affected they'll 4 never buy another Brighton product. 5 That assumption I have additional difficulty 6 with. 7 I mean, my mother was a big shopper from these kinds of products, and some products she liked and some 8 9 products she didn't. 10 The notion that there's a bag that's similar to 11 a Brighton bag causes her to never buy another Brighton 12 again is just one that isn't in my radar screen, so --13 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Well, let me -- let me move a 14 little bit away from that -- that exact analogy. 15 There could be some people who never bought 16 again and there could be other people who stopped buying 17 for the next five years because they feel put off and there could be other people who don't buy for the next 18 19 year because they feel put off. And we're just trying 20 to come up with an estimate of how many people there 21 would be and --JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Well, but, you know, 22 23 usually when you do that, the expert actually has some expertise in counterfeiting, and there are studies that 24

show affects of counterfeiting on consumer behavior.

25

- 1 when do you that, you take some percentage, you take the
- 2 numbers, you apply it.
- 3 I'm still having this trouble where we have all
- 4 these -- you have like some great facts, but I'm not
- sure how they get glued together it.
- 6 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Yeah.
- 7 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: And so what -- what was
- 8 the purpose here, the -- you have a -- in the actual
- 9 damages, you also have the alternative of Coldwater's
- 10 profits?
- 11 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: In copyright one can recover the
- 12 profits and the actual damages.
- 13 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Right.
- 14 And then you have this -- the -- you have that
- on the trade dress as well.
- 16 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: And in the trade dress, the jury
- found numbers for the profits and actual damages --
- 18 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Correct.
- 19 PETER ROSS, ESQ.: -- but we were awarded as part of
- 20 the judgment just the actual damages.
- JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Just the actual damages,
- 22 right, so --
- JUDGE FLETCHER: You chose the damages.
- 24 JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Because obviously it's a
- 25 much bigger number.

```
PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Yes.
 1
         JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Right.
 2
         PETER ROSS, ESQ.:
 3
                            Yeah.
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: So I quess the purpose of
 4
      that is if they found no actual damages but they found
 5
      some significant profits, you could have taken the
 6
 7
     profits.
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: That's right.
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Okay.
         PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Yeah.
10
               So on -- on the damages, I think it was enough
11
      for the jury that they were given that they could use to
12
      make an estimate that was reasonable.
13
               I think I'm --
14
15
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: You are.
16
         PETER ROSS, ESQ.: -- out of time.
17
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Thank you. I appreciate
18
      your argument.
               Ms. Stetson, we'll give you a few minutes for
19
      rebuttal.
20
          PETER ROSS, ESQ.: Thank you, your Honor.
21
          JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Thank you.
2.2
23
          CATHERINE E. STETSON, ESQ.: Thank you, your
24
      Honors. A couple quick points.
25
               To your questions just now about the -- what
```

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ORAL ARGUMENT - 1/13/2011

you've described, Judge McKeown, as "the constellation 1 of data out there, " I think it's -- it's correct that 2 there is some data in the record supporting the idea 3 that there may have been a basis for a legitimate and 4 5 substantiated lost customer field. The problem is the theory at record excerpts 6 7 274 to 286 that Wunderlich put in front of the jury and 8 the theory at record excerpts -- supplemental record 9 excerpts 1771 that counsel for Brighton reiterated to the jury in his closing argument is that the loss of 10 11 115,000 transactions under these circumstances seems conservative. 12 But, Judge Clifton, as you pointed out, the 13 fact that, you know, the number of hypothetical lost 14 15 transactions seems small in comparison to other Brighton

wrong number, the fact that you're ending up with a
number that looks reasonable is meaningless.

So on the damages point, I would essentially
see counsel's Story Parchment and raise him Polar Bear,
Murphy Tugboat, Parlor Enterprises, which is the case
where Wunderlich's theories were knocked back by the
Court of Appeals and a jury verdict overturned.

transactions is irrelevant if it's not based on some

relevant data to the inquiry; if you're starting with a

16

17

25

Quickly on generic, if you look at Page 147 of

1	our record excerpts, you will find, Judge McKeown, as
2	you pointed out, our argument that the Court had omitted
3	an important instruction, and it was the instruction
4	that the plaintiff in a trade dress infringement case
5	bears the burden of showing non-genericness.
6	Now, to the question about whether in the
7	hypothetical event the jury had been presented with that
8	instruction and had been asked that predicate question,
9	"Has the plaintiff proven non-genericness?" whether the
10	jury could have found these items generic, I would point
11	you to what I think is an instructive quote from the
12	Yurman Designs case, which is a relatively recent case
13	out of the Second Circuit:
14	"Without a specification of the design
15	futures that compose the trade dress, different
16	jurors given the same line of products may
17	conceive the dress in terms of different elements
18	and features so that the verdict may be based on
19	inconsistent findings."
20	Where you have, as in this case, a recitation
21	throughout the trial of a number of different
22	combinations and permutations of trade dress, and you
23	just heard another one today from Brighton's counsel,
24	braiding braiding was not part of the trade dress
25	that was claimed in the interrogatory responses it's

1	going to have to be put to the jury whether that trade
2	dress in combination or in multiple combinations was so
3	broad and so overinclusive that it essentially
4	threatened, as Yurman described it, to 'fence off' a
5	part of the product market that is incredibly common in
6	handbag design.
7	So with those points, if there are no further
8	questions, I would submit.
9	JUDGE McKEOWN, PRESIDING: Thank you.
10	I'd like to thank both counsel for your
11	arguments today. Very helpful.
12	And we'll now adjourn Brighton Collectibles
13	versus Coldwater Creek and submit it.
14	0
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
L	

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1	CERTIFICATE
2	
3	I, Melanie M. Faulconer, certify
4	that the foregoing transcript is a true
5	record of said proceedings, that I am not
6	connected by blood or marriage with any of
7	the parties herein, nor interested directly
8	or indirectly in the matter in controversy,
9	nor am I in the employ of counsel.
10	I have hereunto subscribed my name
11	this 18th day of September, 2012.
12	Danian Alonza
13	Damian Honzo Damanallago on behalf of Melanie M. Faulconer
14	MELANIE M. FAULCONER
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
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PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and **not a party to this action**. I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 808 Wilshire Boulevard, 3rd Floor, Santa Monica, CA 90401.

On September 28, 2012, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF DAVID W. SWIFT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NHW'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION AS TO **PLAINTIFF'S LOST PROFIT DAMAGES** on the interested parties in this action as follows:

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

BY CM/ECF NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING: I electronically filed the document(s) with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system. Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the CM/ECF system. Participants in the case who are not registered CM/ECF users will be served by mail or by other means permitted by the court rules.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct and that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made.

Executed on September 28, 2012, at Santa Monica, California.

/s/ Nikki R. Shlosser Nikki R. Shlosser

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SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF DAVID SWIFT

10-CV-00419-CAB-WVG

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SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF DAVID SWIFT

10-CV-00419-CAB-WVG